Winston Churchill and the bombing of German cities, 1940‒1945 by Lee, Peter & McHattie, Colin
Shaping His Story: 
Churchill and the bombing of German cities 
1940 - 1945 
 
 
 
Dr Peter Lee BSc MA PhD 
Principal Lecturer in Ethics and Political Theory 
University of Portsmouth & 
Royal Air Force College Cranwell 
 
Colin McHattie MSc MA 
MA in Air Power History, Theory and Practice 
University of Birmingham 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article explores the ways in which Winston Churchill shaped the historiography 
of the strategic air offensive against Germany. Beginning with Churchill’s view of 
history and the writing of his place in it, the paper examines his willingness to secure 
that place through revisionism and obscurantism, where the bomber offensive is 
concerned, in his magnum opus, The Second World War. This approach is reinforced 
by his obstruction of the post-war British bombing survey and his interference in the 
writing of the official history of the bomber offensive which was published in 1961. 
This study highlights a consistent pattern of behaviour in the way Churchill sought to 
shape the history of the bomber offensive to ensure as far as possible that this 
controversial aspect of the war would not detract from his personal standing. The 
analysis of Churchill’s attempts to write history in his own image – or at least to his 
own advantage – concludes with an assessment of the extent to which he was 
motivated primarily by moral concern for the consequences of area bombing or by 
self-interested unease over future political and reputational implications.  
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Introduction 
Dresden lay in smouldering ruin following the devastating RAF Bomber Command 
night raid on 13
th
/14
th
 February 1945. Although the US Eighth Air Force carried out 
follow-up daytime raids over the next 48 hours, by far the greatest proportion of 
damage to the city resulted from the night attack by Bomber Command. It was the 
climax of the night area offensive: ‘the crowning achievement in a long, arduous and 
relentless development of a principle of bombing which the Royal Air Force had 
initially adopted as a retaliatory measure... and to which the greater part of Bomber 
Command had subsequently always been devoted’.1 
  
As details of the raid and its consequences spread, public and private dissenting 
voices increasingly questioned the morality and the effectiveness of British area 
bombing policy.
2
 At that moment, Winston Churchill – Prime Minister, Minister of 
Defence and ultimate custodian of the area bombing policy – attempted a breathtaking 
volte-face. He sent his now infamous message to the Chiefs of Staff instructing them 
that ‘the moment has come when the question of bombing German cities simply for 
the sake of increasing terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed’.3 He 
added that ‘the destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of 
Allied bombing… I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military 
objectives… rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction’.4 Churchill’s 
sanctimonious rebuke shocked Charles Portal, then Chief of the Air Staff, who would 
not, could not, let the censure stand unchallenged: insisting that the statement be 
withdrawn and replaced by a version that was somewhat more discreet and fairly 
worded.
5
 The new minute was issued on 1
st
 April 1945, and it is from this minute that 
Churchill quotes two sentences in Triumph and Tragedy.
6
 It concluded with the 
comment that ‘we must see to it that our attacks do not do more harm to ourselves in 
the long run than they do to the enemy’s immediate war effort’.7 
  
There is general agreement in the historiography of the bomber offensives that the 
original minute should be seen as a calculated attempt to distance himself from the 
political and moral furore over Dresden and area bombing.
8
 The bombing of Dresden 
was probably the catalyst for the formation of post-war ethical debate, even if, to the 
                                               
1 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945,  
(London, HMSO, 1961) [4 volumes] [hereafter referred to as SAOG] Volume III, p 109 
2 See Paul Addison and Jeremy Crang (eds.) Firestorm: The Bombing of Dresden, 1945  
(London, Pimlico, 2006); David Hall, ‘Black, White and Grey: Wartime Arguments for and against the 
Strategic Bomber Offensive’, in Canadian Military History, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter 1998) pp. 7-19 
3 The National Archives of the United Kingdom [TNA] PREM 3/12 folio 25, Prime Minister to 
General Ismay (for Chiefs of Staff Committee) and the Chief of the Air Staff, 28th March 1945. 
[Subsequent references to TNA documents will be preceded by the department code:  
AIR - Air Ministry and Royal Air Force records; CAB – Cabinet Office records;  
PREM – Prime Minister’s Office records] 
4 ibid. 
5 Webster and Frankland, SAOG, Volume III, p 117 
6 Winston Spencer Churchill, The Second World War, (London, Cassell, 1948/1954) [6 volumes] 
Vol. VI, Triumph and Tragedy, p 470 
7 PREM 3/12 folio 22, Prime Minister to General Ismay (for Chiefs of Staff Committee) and the Chief 
of the Air Staff, 1st April 1945 
8 See for example: Tami Davis Biddle, ‘Dresden 1945: Reality, History and Memory’ Journal of 
Modern History, Volume 72, Number 2, April 2008, pp. 413-450; David Reynolds, In Command of 
History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (London, Penguin, 2005), p 481; Max 
Hastings, Bomber Command  (London, Michael Joseph, 1979) p 344 
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operational commanders and the bomber crews, it was just another raid.
9
 
Furthermore, as Best has suggested, the minute demonstrates that Churchill, aware of 
the issues likely to be raised in any future war crimes trials, sensed the need for pre-
emptive action in advance of the possibility that British area bombing might, 
embarrassingly, be cited in a tu quoque defence.
10
  
  
The ‘Dresden Memo’ indicated the end of Churchill’s previous advocacy of the area 
bombing policy; it also marked the beginning of a sustained effort by Churchill over 
several years to ensure that any subsequent harm to his reputation or legacy be 
minimised as far as possible – including through the obscuring of the memo itself. 
Consequently, this article will explore Churchill’s shaping of the historiography of the 
bomber offensive, which would, in turn, frame subsequent political, operational and 
moral assessments of the policy. First, Churchill’s view of history, the writing of his 
place in it, and his willingness to secure that place through historical revisionism and 
selectivity will be explored. Second, his minimal, obscurantist treatment of the 
bomber offensive in his own magnum opus, The Second World War (SWW) will be 
assessed, as will, third, his obstruction of the post-war British bombing survey. Then 
fourth, his interference in the writing of the official history of the bomber offensive, 
published in 1961, will highlight a long-standing pattern in the way he sought to 
shape its history. Each of these activities will be viewed through the lens of his words 
and actions – public and private – concerning area bombing. This analysis of 
Churchill’s attempts to write history in his own image – or at least to his own 
advantage – will conclude with an assessment of the extent to which he was 
motivated primarily by moral concern for the consequences of area bombing or by 
self-interested concern for future political and reputational implications.  
 
Writing his own history 
Long before Churchill became Prime Minister he displayed a heightened awareness of 
history and a desire to ensure a place in it. During the 1930s in the House of 
Commons Churchill famously concluded an exchange with Stanley Baldwin with the 
words: ‘History will say that the Right Honourable Gentleman is wrong in this 
matter’, and then after a pause, with a broad grin on his face, ‘I know it will, because I 
shall write that history’.11 Echoing the sentiment, in response to an observation that 
History would place him amongst the world’s great men, he replied: ‘That will 
depend on who writes the history’.12 Perhaps less funny was a comment to Maurice 
Ashley: ‘Give me the facts Ashley, and I will twist them the way I want to suit my 
argument’.13 It would be unfair to overly condemn Churchill for remarks that may 
                                               
9 Peter Gray, ‘Dresden 1945: Just Another Raid’ Royal Air Force Air Power Review, Vol. 4, No. 1             
Spring 2001 pp. 1-16 
10 Geoffrey Best, Churchill: A Study in Greatness (London, Hambledon and London, 2001) p 241 
Tu quoque’ is an argument which consists of turning an argument back on the accuser. 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) [Fifth Edition] 
11 Malcolm MacDonald, Titans and Others (London, Collins, 1972) p 89 quoted in Ramsden, ibid. p 3 
although not recorded in Hansard, it is nevertheless widely reported, even though it may well be 
apocryphal. A similar statement to Roosevelt and Stalin is attributed to Churchill in Anne Perkins, 
Baldwin (London, Haus Publishing, 2006) p 137 
12 John Ramsden, ‘That will depend on who writes the history’. Winston Churchill as his own historian. 
(London, Queen Mary and Westfield College, 1997) p 3  
13 Maurice Ashley, Churchill as Historian (London, Secker and Warburg, 1968) p 76 
[Ashley was an historian, and served as literary assistant to Churchill between the wars. He later 
published a critical analysis of Churchill, and his methods as a historian, in the volume quoted] 
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have been laced with humour. Yet his use of humour should not be easily dismissed 
or trivialised – it was a powerful weapon that he wielded effectively against many 
political opponents. 
 
Churchill described his multi-volume The Second World War, not as history, but as 
his case, one that he would not allow anyone else to put forward on his behalf. But if 
Churchill wrote in order to vindicate his role, it was only because he thought what he 
had done had been, on the whole, right. As he put it: 
The tale is told from the standpoint of the British Prime Minister, with 
special responsibility, as Minister of Defence for military affairs… It would 
be easier to produce a series of after-thoughts, when the answers to all the 
riddles were known, but I must leave this to the historians, who will in due 
course be able to pronounce their considered judgements.
14
 
Although motivated by the need to secure his family’s financial security, and to 
provide the means to allow him to pursue his career as a politician, Churchill was also 
under no illusions about what might happen to his reputation if he were not to be one 
of the historians, or, as he insisted, to make his own contribution to history.
15
 As a 
result, his history was heavily marked by his desire to set the record straight, and also 
to account for policies that turned out to be less than successful, or to justify his 
position on issues like the second front. He was quick off the mark, aware that public 
perception of the conflict would take time to set firm. He intended to be the principal 
architect of the history of World War II, and was determined to build on a global 
scale. However, the work did not exist in a vacuum because many other leading 
figures were beginning to write their own accounts.
16
  Books by Butcher and Ingersoll 
had already emerged which had irked Churchill.
17
 Acutely aware of his international 
standing he would not allow anyone else to establish an enduring record. Ideally, he 
needed to be first, but that would not be possible given the vast canvas on which he 
intended to paint. 
In the preface to The Gathering Storm, Churchill writes that ‘the author hangs the 
chronicle and discussion of great military and political events upon the thread of the 
personal experiences of an individual’ observing that his book is ‘a contribution to 
history’.18 As the events of the war were unfolding Churchill was conscious of living 
through a heroic period of history and in many of his actions and decisions as Prime 
Minister he actually asked himself what the judgement of history might be.
19
 In 
presenting his work as an autobiography, Churchill was consistent with the sentiment 
expressed in his previous multi-volume history The World Crisis.
20
  However, Plumb 
describes SWW as belonging to a different category from his earlier work; part 
autobiography, part general history. Whereas in The World Crisis Churchill had to 
rely on external published sources after his removal from office following the failure 
                                               
14 Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV, ‘The Hinge of Fate’ (London, Cassell, 1951) p ix 
15 Reynolds, In Command of History, pp.23-35 
16 Ashley Jackson, Churchill (London, Quercus, 2011) pp. 357-360 
17 Harry Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1946);  
and Ralph Ingersoll, Top Secret (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1946) 
18 Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. I, The Gathering Storm, p vii 
19 Maurice Ashley, ‘Churchill and History’ International Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 1, January 1966     
pp. 87-94  
20 Winston Spencer Churchill, The World Crisis (London, Thornton Butterworth, 1923) Volume II, p 9 
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of the Dardanelles campaign, shortly before leaving the wartime Prime Minister’s 
office he arranged it so that Cabinet ministers could take with them copies of War 
Cabinet memorandums and other documents, could have access to Cabinet documents 
issued to them, and could quote from such documents.
21
 Churchill’s extraordinary feat 
in writing The Second World War was thereby achieved on the back of privileged 
access to highly confidential government documents, the bedrock of the entire 
project.
22
  
The care with which he had his wartime documents printed and then labelled as 
‘Personal Minutes’ or ‘Personal Telegrams’ suggests that Churchill acted with one 
eye on history.
23
 It was certainly assumed that Churchill was writing memoranda for 
inclusion in future memoirs.
 24
 ‘Another one for the book’ became a private joke in 
Whitehall.
25
 Although he would have less time for historical self-consciousness once 
he became Prime Minister, there is a clear suggestion that his injunction against terror 
bombing written in his memorandum of 28
th
 March 1945 was written for the benefit 
of the historical record. Under his bargain with Sir Edward Bridges, then Cabinet 
Secretary, Churchill was able to remove the documents that lie at the heart of SWW on 
his departure from Downing Street in July 1945. In the 1940s it seemed unlikely that 
British government papers would be open to public inspection until well into the 
twenty-first century. It was only in 1958 that Parliament enacted a fifty-year rule, and 
it was only in 1967, after Churchill’s death, that the time limit was reduced to thirty 
years.
26
  
Churchill’s narrative was therefore guaranteed to command attention for a significant 
period of time, reinforced by the minutes, telegrams, and directives which took up so 
much of the text. The documents that were included had been carefully selected for 
public consumption; not just to protect sensitive government information, but also, in 
many cases where Churchill sought to defend himself against the emerging 
historiography. He was anxious that future historians would judge favourably all he 
did and all that he said. This must have influenced his choices and conduct, both 
consciously and unconsciously, particularly when he set out his arguments in 
memoranda, which he knew would, in time, become historical documents. All of this 
led to an emphasis on what Churchill himself thought to be of major significance for 
the future. 
 
In sum, when Churchill came to write his history of the Second World War he had the 
materials prepared, the concepts at hand, and the structure ready. Backed up by a 
substantial organisation, he was the first in the field to attempt a project of such 
                                               
21 WSC memorandum, 23rd May 1945, ‘War Cabinet Documents’ CAB 66/65/70,         
[formerly WP (45) 320] 
22 J.H. Plumb, ‘The Historian’ in Taylor et al, Churchill: Four Faces and the Man   
(London, Allen Lane, 1969) pp. 117-152 
23 CAB 66/65/70 formerly WP (45) 320. War Cabinet Documents: Memorandum. Winston Spencer 
Churchill. 23rd May 1945. See also CAB 21/1652 Recovery of Cabinet Documents from Ministers and 
ex-Ministers. Procedure. WSC to Bridges, 30th April 1945 and Brook to Bridges 18th May 1945 
24 Neville Chamberlain Papers (University of Birmingham Library) NC 7/11/33/132 
15th January 1940. Correspondence between Chamberlain and Halifax 
25 Reynolds, In Command of History, p 112. For an example of the kind of minutes which Churchill 
would send prior to becoming Prime Minister, see Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. I,  
The Gathering Storm, pp. 359-360 
26 Public Records Act 1958. See also CAB 103/621 Implementation of the thirty year rule 
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magnitude, a fact of which he well understood the importance. With the resources at 
his disposal he was able to cast his work into an almost official mould. More 
important is that the war, its narrative and its structure, was arranged in a deliberate 
way by Churchill. The phases of the war are the phases into which he divided it, and 
according to Plumb this deeply influenced subsequent historians.
27
 They move down 
the broad avenues that he drove down, through the war’s confusion and complexity. 
Hence, Churchill, the historian, lies at the very heart of the historiography of the 
Second World War, and will always remain there.  
 
This does not absolve him from criticism; if anything it highlights the need for greater 
critique. Writing in 1965, Robert Rhodes James highlighted that an incomplete 
account, such as Churchill’s narrative, was not that of an historian, but rather as one 
who expounded the course of events for submission to future judgement.
28
 
Furthermore, writing at a time when he was still seeking further political office, 
Churchill was precluded from describing events in retrospect with the calm gaze of an 
uncommitted historian. Clear evidence of this is provided when Kelly, his literary 
assistant writes in a memo to Churchill: ‘You may wish to reconsider at a later stage 
the story of the terror bombing of the German civilian population… in case you need 
German help and good will in the future.’ 29  In response to such an injunction 
Churchill had two main options. First, complete transparency: set out the case for area 
bombing that he supported so assiduously during the policing of the Empire in the 
1920s and throughout the war; or second, opt for obscurantism in the hope that the 
afterglow of victory over a heinous enemy would conceal the darker decisions and 
actions that contributed to the defeat Hitler and Nazism. Hence, it is a key premise of 
this paper that it is often the silence with respect to the question of strategic bombing 
which raises the most significant questions. By his omissions Churchill was also 
shaping the means by which political, operational and, consequently, moral 
assessment of his actions, and sometimes inactions, could be made; through deliberate 
historical revisionism he skewed the way that the bombing campaign would be 
perceived by subsequent generations. 
 
The Second World War and the bomber offensive 
Volume five of SWW, Closing the Ring, covers the period from the implementation of 
the Pointblank Directive to the commencement of preparations for Operation 
Overlord.
30
 As described in the Air Historical Branch narrative of the period it 
represents the period of the execution of the full offensive by Bomber Command, 
supported by the expansion of the Eighth Air Force.
31
  
 
One contributory reason for Churchill’s failure to address pressing issues in the 
bomber campaign in a coherent manner was his employment of historical advisors on 
                                               
27 Plumb, J.H. ‘The Historian’ in Taylor et al, Churchill: Four Faces and the Man   
(London, Allen Lane, 1969) pp. 117-152 
28 Robert Rhodes James, quoted in Ashley Churchill as Historian p 87       
[A shortcoming of Ashley’s analysis of ‘Churchill as Historian’ is his lack of scholarly apparatus]  
29 Churchill Papers, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge [hereafter referred to in footnotes as 
CHUR] CHUR 4/333 folio 146 
30 Pointblank was the directive for the Combined Bomber Offensive. See Webster and Frankland, 
SAOG, Volume IV, pp. 158-160. Overlord was the invasion of North West Europe. 
31 AIR 41/43 ‘The RAF in the Bombing Offensive Against Germany’, Volume V, The Full Offensive; 
see also Wesley Frank Craven and James L. Cate [eds.] The Army Air Forces in World War Two,  
(Chicago, University of Chicago, 1948/1958) [7 volumes], Volume II, p 665 
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military and naval aspects of the conflict within the Syndicate: the team of researchers 
and writers brought together to help produce SWW. He did not have anyone engaged 
in researching the air war. General Henry Pownall, military consultant to Churchill in 
the Syndicate, kept reminding him of the gap, but Churchill procrastinated and it was 
not until the summer of 1950 that Air Chief Marshal Sir Guy Garrod was recruited to 
write drafts on the strategic bomber offensive.
32
 In consequence, the material was 
finally published in volume five, Closing the Ring, even when it belonged 
chronologically in volume four, The Hinge of Fate. The result is a number of 
fragments about the air war, even though they represent some of the most important 
strategic debates about the conduct of the entire war.  
 
The selection of Garrod in itself was an interesting choice. He was neither a 
professional historian, like Deakin, nor a staff officer accustomed to writing reports, 
like Pownall. Moreover, he had spent the last two years of the war in the Far East and 
the Mediterranean, and he lacked any first-hand knowledge of the bomber offensive. 
Given the passion that had been aroused by Arthur Harris this may well have been a 
deliberate ploy. Nevertheless, after Churchill and Garrod had lunched together on 18
th
 
November 1950, Pownall wrote to General Ismay [somewhat tongue-in-cheek] that 
‘Master is now convinced that it was most important that the strategic bombing 
offensive should have proper mention’.33  
 
Garrod’s brief was to produce about 10,000 words on ‘The Mounting Air Offensive’ 
to ensure that it was addressed to Churchill’s satisfaction.34 In mid-December 1950 
Garrod forwarded his proposed outline for the chapter on the bomber offensive to 
Churchill. Integral to this was an explanation of how Bomber Command had come to 
adopt a policy of area bombing by night, and how this clashed with the American 
policy of precision bombing by day.
35
 At the end of August 1940, Churchill had 
arranged that the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) should work directly under the 
orders of the Minister of Defence. The revised role required the formulation of the 
details of such plans as were communicated to them by Churchill himself, although 
the JPC was permitted to initiate plans of its own, after reference to General Ismay.
36
 
However, in a letter to the Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden, Churchill 
commented that there was no question of the JPC ‘submitting military advice to him’. 
They were merely to work at plans in accordance with directives which Churchill 
gave to them.
37
 As Best remarks, Churchill often behaved as if he were the supreme 
commander.
38
 Area bombing policy occurred primarily at his behest and in 
accordance with his instructions. 
 
The final text in SWW was reduced to a reference to prolonged and obstinate 
argument on the policy of night or day bombing, and the generous rivalry in trying 
out the opposing theories with the utmost sacrifice and heroism by both British and 
American crews.
39
 But these were not the only changes imposed on Garrod’s outline. 
                                               
32 Ismay Papers, 2/3 folios 159, 161 and 228. The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s 
College, London  
33 Ismay Papers 2/3 folio 237, 19th November 1950 
34 CHUR 4/25 folio 14 
35 CHUR 4/329 folios 121-130 
36 ibid. p 220 [Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay was Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence] 
37 ibid. p 220 
38 Geoffrey Best, Churchill and War (London, Hambledon and London, 2005) pp. 165-174 
39 Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. V, Closing the Ring, p 461 
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At Churchill’s request Lord Cherwell, Churchill’s erstwhile scientific expert who had 
advised on how to make area bombing more effective during the war, proposed a 
number of revisions and exclusions. Amongst the exclusions was the provision of 
figures on the manpower engaged in flak units, night fighter squadrons, and in the 
production of aircraft for defence of the German homeland. Subsequently, it has been 
acknowledged that this diversion of men and materials represented a primary 
achievement of the bombing campaign; ironically, an achievement downplayed by 
Churchill.
40
 
 
On examination, virtually the entire section of the chapter was written by the 
Syndicate, with Churchill adding minor textual alterations such as the addition of the 
word ‘courage’ to the description of the German people. 41  When questioned by 
Saunders, for his recollections of Dresden in May 1950, Churchill wrote ‘I cannot 
recall anything about it. I thought the Americans did it’.42 This squeamishness on 
Churchill’s part stands in stark, almost obscene, contrast with his oft-repeated views 
on the bombing of the German cities. He had earlier sought to create conditions 
intolerable to the mass of the German population – which went to the heart of the 
strategic bombing debate, as ‘precision attacks’ on military-industrial targets gave 
way to the ‘terror bombing’ of urban areas, designed to break civilian morale. 43 
Churchill cut several similar remarks when editing documents for inclusion in The 
Second World War. For instance, the text of his first meeting with Stalin in the 
Kremlin on 12
th
 August 1942 recorded Churchill’s assurances that Britain looked 
upon German civilian morale as a military target and ‘hoped to shatter twenty German 
cities, as we shattered Cologne’.44 As the war went on, he added, Britain ‘hoped to 
shatter almost every dwelling in almost every German city’. Of course, Churchill 
needed to sound particularly bellicose when Stalin had been accusing the British of 
inertia and even cowardice.
45
 But Churchill also expressed similar sentiments in a 
memorandum about Italy in November 1942 in which he declared that ‘all the 
industrial cities should be attacked in an intense fashion, every effort being made to 
terrorise and paralyse the population’.46 Nevertheless, the exchange with Stalin was 
excised from the final text when Deakin subsequently paraphrased the transcript into 
a more acceptable form.
47
  
 
                                               
40 Richard Overy The Air War 1939 – 1945 (London, Europa, 1980) p 122 
41 CHUR 4/372 folios 36 and 83-85 
42 CHUR 4/390A, 11th May 1950 
Note of telephone conversation between WSC and Hilary St. George Saunders 
[Along with Denis Richards, Saunders was writing a three volume popular history of the Royal Air 
Force in the Second World War. According to Cox, writing in Jeffrey Grey (ed.), ‘The Last Word: 
Essays on Official History in the United States and the British Commonwealth.’ (Westport, Praeger, 
2003) p 152, Saunders, although briefly considered a candidate to write the official history of the air 
offensive, was not a serious historian, and would have almost certainly produced a work of 
questionable academic value. Frankland goes further, suggesting that Saunders was not unduly 
concerned with factual accuracy and had little or no idea of historical research] 
See Noble Frankland History at War (London, de la Mare, 1998) p 49 
43 CHUR 4/333 folio 146 
44 CHUR 4/279A-C folio 245 
45 ibid. 
46 CHUR 4/287 folio 107 
47 Compare CHUR 4/279 folio 245 and Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, The Hinge of 
Fate, p 432  
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Churchill’s obfuscation, selective memory even, of the events surrounding the 
bombings in general and the bombing of Dresden in particular contrasts markedly 
with the recorded comments of Sir Arthur Harris on the bomber offensive during his 
tenure as Commander-in-Chief. Harris had not been reticent in expressing his views 
on the role of Bomber Command. Yet analysis of Churchill’s decisions in the early 
years of the war demonstrate that he was ultimately responsible for the area bombing 
strategy that was already in place before Arthur Harris was appointed Commander-in-
Chief of Bomber Command. In the introduction to his own official account, Despatch 
on War Operations, Harris described the main task laid upon his command as 
‘[focused] attacks on the morale of the enemy civil population, and, in particular, of 
the industrial workers’. 48  It was his opinion that this was to be achieved by 
destroying, mainly by incendiary attacks, first, four large cities in the Ruhr area, and 
then, as opportunity offered, fourteen other industrial cities across Germany.
49
 The 
aim of the attacks on town areas had already been set out in an Air Staff paper on 23
rd
 
September 1941: 
 
 The ultimate aim of the attack on a town is to break the morale of the 
 population who occupies it. To ensure this we must achieve two things: first, 
 we must make the town physically uninhabitable, and, secondly, we must 
 make the people conscious of constant personal danger. The immediate aim, is 
 therefore, twofold, namely, to produce (i) destruction, and (ii) the fear of 
 death.
50
 
 
Months before Harris took command, and under the authority of Churchill, the 
principle of inflicting death, destruction and the fear of further death on the German 
population was established. Since the 1920s it had been assumed by air power 
theorists that such a use of air power would inevitably break the morale and will to 
fight of an enemy.
51
 Reflecting later on Harris’s intended memoir, Churchill wrote in 
a letter to Wing Commander John Lawrence, who assisted Harris with his writing, 
dated 3
rd
 August 1946, stating:  
 
Our friend should be very careful in all that he writes not to admit anything 
not justified by the circumstances and the actions of the enemy in the 
measures we took to bomb Germany. We gave them full notice to clear out of 
their munition making cities. In fact, they had very good shelters and 
protection, and the position of the civilian population was very different from 
that of London, Coventry, Liverpool, etc. when they were bombed in the 
second year of the war. I am not quite clear about Dresden. It may be that we 
were asked to do this as part of some large military combination, but I am 
afraid the civilian losses there were unduly heavy.
52
 
 
                                               
48 Sir Arthur Harris Despatch on War Operations: 23rd February 1942 to 8th May 1945  
with an introduction by Sebastian Cox. (London, Frank Cass, 1995)) p 7 
49 ibid. 
50 Harris, Despatch on War Operations, p 7 
51 See for example: Giulio Douhet The Command of the Air [translated by Dino Ferrari] 
(New York, Coward-McCann, 1942);  
Basil Liddell Hart, Paris, Or The Future of War  (London, Kegan Paul, 1925) pp. 43-48 
52 CHUR 2/150 Letter from Churchill to Lawrence, 3rd August 1946 (‘Most Private and Confidential’) 
quoted in Martin Gilbert, Never Despair (London, Heinemann, 1988) p 259 
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The letter clearly demonstrates Churchill’s continuing unease about Dresden, and the 
manner in which he continued to try and influence the judgement of history. 
However, the limited moral assessment he offers here is summed up in his view that 
the bombings were ‘justified by the circumstances and the actions of the enemy’. 
However, he was not alone in ignoring Dresden, or glossing over his differences of 
opinion with Harris. Despite the public interest which was aroused after press reports 
of the bombing, and the interventions by Richard Stokes MP in the House of 
Commons and previously by George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester, in the House of 
Lords, regarding bombing policy as it related to attacks on civilians, other wartime 
leaders were also careful to avoid mention of Dresden in their memoirs.
53
 In his 
autobiography, ‘Hap’ Arnold, Commander-in-Chief of the US Army Air Force, made 
no mention of the raid, whilst Eisenhower, from whose Paris-based headquarters the 
formal orders for the raid on Dresden had come, and from where the press briefing 
which led to knowledge of the bombing emerging into the public domain, made no 
reference to the attack in his widely read memoir, Crusade in Europe.
54
 
 
Critics of his wartime account observe that Churchill’s use of documentation is 
incomplete, pointing out that whilst he printed many of his own appreciations and 
instructions, he rarely gives the answers or responses he received. Nor does he reveal 
what went on inside Cabinet relating to the grand strategy of the war, apart from 
occasions when he mentions its broad approval, or, rarely, disapproval, which he 
describes as obstruction. Although Churchill gives the reader his reasons for the 
conclusions he reached, he seldom attempts to defend them in the full light of 
competing contemporary perspectives of from historical retrospect. Nor does he 
attempt to draw an elaborate moral because he profoundly believes that history speaks 
for itself.
 55
 In the case of the bomber offensive, however, the references to it in SWW 
whisper rather than speak. 
 
Churchill devoted just thirteen pages of text to the strategic bombing offensive out of 
the 3,597 pages that constitute the entire work: almost entirely dissociating himself 
from this aspect of the ‘means’ of victory while allowing Arthur Harris, Air Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief Bomber Command from February 1942 until September 1945, 
to bear the subsequent opprobrium for a campaign which the latter executed – as 
directed – but did not author.56 This bifurcation of ends and means became more 
significant for Churchill as he sought to maximise his personal credit for victory while 
minimising his association with the application of air power that reached its nadir on 
that February night in Dresden. Ultimately, any misgivings Churchill had about the 
impact of the bomber offensive in general, and Dresden in particular, were set aside 
as the reviews of The Second World War overlooked these concerns in just the way he 
might have wished. 
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Surveying the damage 
As the war in Europe approached its conclusion there was another episode that 
demonstrated Churchill’s awareness of history and his desire to shape it. On this 
occasion it was his behind-the-scenes manoeuvring rather than his words that would 
have long-lasting consequences for the historiography of the strategic bomber 
offensive. 
 
The desire for a scientific evaluation of the results of the offensive had been in the 
minds of those directing the campaign from an early date.
57
 The British had long been 
interested in conducting a joint survey with the Americans to assess how effective its 
bombing had been.
58
 As the war progressed such suggestions were vigorously 
rejected. In the spring of 1944, when they were first circulated in USAAF circles, 
General Spaatz provided both official and bureaucratic reasons for avoiding any joint 
assessment.
59
 These were largely cover for Spaatz’ primary concern; that the 
American and British efforts would end up being merged in the public’s perception, 
with deleterious consequences for the USA and the USAAF. This, at a time when the 
leadership of the USAAF was still pursuing its quest to become an independent air 
force. Arnold and Spaatz sought to distance the Army Air Forces in Europe from any 
reassessment of the roles and missions it carried out as part of any analysis of the 
combined bomber offensive.
60
 In late 1944 during a debate with Eisenhower over the 
bombing of Berlin, Spaatz had argued to his Chief of Air Staff, General ‘Hap’ Arnold, 
that ‘there is no doubt in my mind that the RAF want very much to have the US tarred 
with the morale bombing aftermath which we feel will be terrific’.61  
 
The British did not appear to have appreciated the degree of American reluctance for 
a joint venture, and the Army Air Forces’ desire to keep its inquest in American 
hands.
62
 When Portal submitted his proposal to the Chiefs of Staff expressing the 
need for an investigation into the bombing, he was clearly thinking that the survey 
would be a joint one, even if the respective governments drew their own conclusions 
from the information obtained.
63
 The Chiefs of Staff accepted the principle that the 
survey must be placed under the direction of a civilian of high position, who had no 
responsibilities for the formulation or execution of the policy of the strategic air 
offensive.
64
 However, the task of forming a survey team was not to prove easy. There 
had been, and continued to be, competing interests at work in the formulation of 
bombing policy. Similarly, there were competing interests at work in attempting to 
influence the investigation of the results of the policy.
65
 Thus, in September 1944 a 
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Bombing Analysis Unit was set up within the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), under the guidance of Professor Zuckermann, who 
had been, and still was, Air Chief Marshal Tedder’s principal adviser on the attack on 
German communications. At the same time, Zuckermann wrote to the Deputy Chief 
of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Bottomley urging the necessity of ascertaining the 
relative merits of area and precision bombing.
66
 
 
Perhaps because of competing interests, or possibly because of bureaucratic inertia, 
progress was slow in establishing a survey team. In mid-October, Portal addressed a 
minute to his Secretary of State, Sir Archibald Sinclair, outlining his proposals for a 
British Bombing Research Mission, with an independent and impartial head of high 
status to ensure that the ultimate findings of the mission will be free of all prejudice 
and will carry the greatest possible weight.
67
 The Scientific Adviser to the Air 
Ministry pointed out ‘as a matter of principle [that] the investigation of damage 
should not be by the people who [were] responsible for planning the attack, 
particularly in cases like this where there has been controversy as to the merits of 
some of the methods’.68 The intention was apparently to present Churchill with a 
more or less agreed structure, and Portal clearly thought that there would be no great 
difficulty in obtaining approval of the scheme, which he said did not seem to him ‘to 
be very complicated and is, so far as I know, entirely non-controversial’.69 
 
All the greater, therefore, must have been the shock caused by Churchill’s reply: an 
absolute refusal to sanction any scheme of the magnitude suggested.
70
 Webster and 
Frankland described the refusal as a ‘bombshell’, and Portal and Sinclair were, as a 
consequence, forced to make preparations for a more modest investigative 
programme.
71
 Efforts were made by Sinclair to circumvent Churchill’s denial of the 
use of manpower and brainpower on the proposed scale. These manoeuvrings led to a 
new proposal being drafted for the War Cabinet by Sinclair, but once again Churchill 
refused to allow the paper to be placed on the agenda.
72
 Instead, he insisted that it 
should first be examined by the Treasury, costed in accordance with peacetime 
practice, and then submitted to the three service ministers and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.
73
  
 
Inviting such detailed Treasury scrutiny of the proposal, as Churchill undoubtedly 
well knew and intended, would impose yet further bureaucratic delay, and place even 
greater difficulties in the way of establishing an effective mission. This action aroused 
the indignation of the Air Ministry, and Portal resolved to appeal to his colleagues on 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee to, in turn, appeal to Churchill directly, without the 
                                                                                                                                      
The Strategic Air War Against Germany: The Official Report of the British Bombing Survey           
(London, Frank Cass, 1998) [pp. xvii-xxii] 
66 Webster and Frankland, SAOG, Volume IV, p 42 
67 AIR 20/3413. Minute from Chief of the Air Staff to Secretary of State, 17th October 1944 
68 Webster and Frankland, SAOG, Volume IV, p 43 
69 AIR 20/3413. Minute from Chief of the Air Staff to Secretary of State, 29th December 1944 
70 AIR 19/434. Minute from Prime Minister to Secretary of State, 3rd January 1945 
71 Webster and Frankland, SAOG, Volume IV, p 45 
72 AIR 19/434. Letter from Sinclair enclosing a draft memorandum to the War Cabinet by Secretary of 
State for Air, First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of State for War, Minister of Home Security, and 
Minister of Economic Warfare, on the ‘Investigation of the effects of the Combined Bomber 
Offensive’ 
73 AIR 19/434. Minute from Prime Minister to Secretary of State, 6th March 1945 
 13 
intermediary of ministers, a move to which they gave their approval. In the resulting 
memorandum, Portal stated: 
 
For many years to come, unless another war supervenes, I cannot conceive 
that any examination of the offensive or defensive aspects of attacks on 
industry can fail to be influenced by the results of the bomber offensive on 
Germany. If we do not proceed without delay with the British Bombing 
Research Mission, we shall face the grave danger of Government opinion on 
the lessons of this war being based largely on propaganda, personal 
recollection, or on the results of investigations by other nations. The only body 
which would be adequately constituted to assess the results of the Combined 
Bomber Offensive and pronounce authoritatively on its value would be an 
American body. I should regard this as most unsatisfactory. American 
bombing methods have differed from our own. It is therefore only to be 
expected that the American report would concentrate upon those results for 
which the Americans have been mainly responsible and in which they would 
quite naturally be most interested, On the other hand, it would almost certainly 
ignore or obscure some of the results of Bomber Command’s operations of 
which I consider it essential to ascertain the importance. Moreover, there 
would be a danger that a rather incomplete picture would be given to the 
world of results of an offensive in which a large proportion of British 
resources had been employed in this war.
74
 
 
From an operational perspective all of this was true, but Churchill was adamant. For 
reasons that he did not make explicit, he plainly had no desire to see any detailed 
survey of the offensive undertaken, and was intent on placing every bureaucratic 
obstacle in its path. One obvious motivation, however, would be the obscuring from 
public eyes – or at least delaying the moment of revelation as far as possible – the 
minutiae of the consequences of the area bombing he advocated, implemented and 
supported: all the way to Dresden. Operational evaluation would inevitably be 
accompanied by increasingly informed moral assessment of key decisions and 
actions, with moral judgement also being passed on the individuals responsible: 
Churchill, potentially, chief among them. His reply on 8
th
 April was to reiterate in 
even harsher terms his refusal to sanction an organisation on the scale proposed for 
what he termed a sterile task.
75
 He offered, as he had done before, the use of thirty 
experts.
76
 It was an unfortunate decision, made against the advice of all those who 
were able to judge the advantages of such an enquiry. It is the main reason why no 
authoritative pronouncement has ever been made in Britain, then, or since, on the 
conduct and results of the bomber offensive. It is also true that, just as Portal was 
afraid would happen, opinion in Britain was indeed largely based on propaganda, 
personal recollection, or investigations by other nations.
77
 That does not necessarily 
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mean that British opinion has been overly critical as a consequence. Churchill would 
have been more concerned if criticism had been intensified in his direction. 
 
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey quite understandably focused on 
American efforts and downplayed the role of Bomber Command. Furthermore, its 
conclusions were often harsh in attitude towards the British contribution, reflecting 
the American’s desire to distance themselves from the taint of area bombing. British 
bombing was portrayed in such a way as to promote the apparent effectiveness and 
precision of their own campaign.
78
 Indeed, the bias was so evident that the American 
official historians felt compelled to apologise for it, writing that ‘the deprecating tone 
with regard to the contribution of the RAF which ran through much of the survey’s 
work… did not reflect a judicious appraisal of the RAF effort’.79 
 
By blocking the Air Ministry’s effort to analyse the work of Bomber Command, 
Churchill ensured that it would not receive the full credit for its contribution – both 
positive and negative – to the war effort. That Portal should have been so effectively 
blocked by Churchill is, to some degree, surprising. But it was consistent with 
Churchill’s occasional agonising about strategic bombing during the war.80 It would 
also prove to be consistent with his aforementioned efforts to radically lower the 
profile of Bomber Command after the war. It would take the publication of Webster 
and Frankland’s official history to correct many of the myths that were allowed to 
grow. However, by the time the official history was published, public perception of 
the bombings had been largely fixed, with Harris and the RAF at the centre of events 
and Churchill barely mentioned. History and popular memory developed without a 
proper understanding of Bomber Command’s important contribution to the 
transportation campaign, the oil campaign, and to the general erosion of Germany’s 
war economy and productivity: for the sake of minimizing public reference to the 
consequences of area bombing.
81
 Tellingly, an outline of the American post-war 
analysis of bombing results, and criticism thereof was deferred to Triumph and 
Tragedy but did not appear in the final text.
82
 Churchill had no intention of raising 
questions about the methods, or effectiveness, of the bombing offensive. 
 
By the end of January 1951 Garrod had produced eighteen pages of typescript for 
Churchill’s consideration. 83  Pownall then set to work on Garrod’s draft and 
condensed it to just two and a half pages, amounting to 4000 words, which was, he 
said, what Churchill had in mind.
84
 Behind the scenes, Cherwell and Garrod engaged 
in much debate about German industrial production in 1944.
85
 To admit that Cherwell 
was correct in his belief that production actually rose would have cast doubt on the 
entire premise of the bomber offensive, with its proclaimed aim of destroying German 
industrial capacity and morale. In the final text a compromise was reached, 
acknowledging Speer’s brilliant control of factory and forced labour to mobilise with 
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extraordinary speed and efficiency.
86
 In so doing, Churchill sought to ensure that the 
Russians were not encouraged to believe that bombing had been ineffective, a not 
insignificant factor given that he was writing at the, then, height of the Cold War.
87
 
 
Churchill claimed in the opening paragraphs of ‘The Mounting Air Offensive’ that 
Bomber Command eventually made a decisive contribution to victory.
88
 That said, the 
remainder of the chapter sees him pulling his punches about the bomber offensive. 
Giving his views on the initial drafts, Sir Norman Brook commented diplomatically 
that ‘The Mounting Offensive’ was a rather flat statement of an endeavour on which 
vast resources and many lives had been expended. He suggested that the chapter was 
disproportionately short, and that it represented a bare summary of the story. He 
opined that, in revision, it would be expanded substantially. He urged Churchill to 
praise the bomber crews, and also to highlight the comparative merits of Bomber 
Command and the Eighth Air Force as regards efficiency, paying particular attention 
to the slow build-up of the American offensive.
89
 However, this idea was dropped 
when statistics from the Air Ministry revealed that the RAF had lost 54,000 men, 
killed, wounded, missing or taken prisoner, compared with an American figure of 
over 94,000. Most significantly, however, when Brook asked Churchill if he was 
prepared to offer a judgement on the value of strategic bombing, the response, boldly 
written in red ink, was ‘Not in this volume’. 90  In fact, his judgement of the 
contribution to victory of strategic air power was reduced to a single paragraph in the 
final volume, Triumph and Tragedy.
91
  
 
Obstructing an official history 
It was not just as official censors that the Cabinet Office assisted Churchill. Sir 
Norman Brook, in particular, spent much time advising on the prose and argument, as 
well as writing whole passages for inclusion in the text. Like Bridges, Brook saw 
himself as helping to expedite a quasi-official account of Britain’s war. To them SWW 
was regarded as the British official history of the war, written by the man most 
qualified to do so.
92
 In this respect it is hard to judge that Churchill had written a mere 
memoir. But it is possible to suggest that in his selection of documents, and in the 
construction of the narrative, Churchill and the Syndicate were editing to obscure 
where they felt it necessary. Setting aside the desire to obtain financial security, 
Churchill’s deepest objective in writing SWW was the search for vindication. He 
wanted to show that he was right, both in terms of the judgements he made and the 
justice of his actions. In this lies the seeds of revisionism – or perhaps blatant, 
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intentional revisionism – and it is therefore prudent to look at the way he shaped 
access to official documents and impeded attempts to create an official history of the 
bomber offensive. 
 
When Churchill was writing SWW academic historians were still barred from access 
to government documents covering the war years. The only exception was for those 
writing the official histories of the British war effort under the auspices of the Cabinet 
Office. In 1947, Churchill agreed that the official historians could have access to his 
‘personal minutes and telegrams’ but he wished ‘to be shown beforehand any extracts 
which it [was] proposed to publish’.93 By 1951 this proviso had been expanded to 
include his approval before ‘substantial use is made of information from those papers 
which [are] not on official record elsewhere’.94 The sense of frustration felt by the 
historians had already been summed up by A.B. Acheson, Secretary to the Advisory 
Panel for the Official Military Histories of the War, when he wrote to Brook that it 
seemed to Professor Butler that Sir Winston has no interest in the official histories 
‘except to obstruct them’ and that so far he had been doing so with considerable 
success.
95
 
 
When Sir Charles Webster was initially nominated to write the official history of the 
strategic air offensive, he did not, at first sight, appear to be an ideal candidate. Unlike 
R.B. Wernham, the first historian approached by the Cabinet Office advisory panel set 
up under Professor J.R.M. Butler, he had no experience of the RAF or its operations, 
but he possessed a formidable intellect, and equally important, was a determined, 
independent, and forceful character, who would brook no interference with his 
work.
96
 There is probably no clearer example of his determination to write the official 
history on his own terms than in a memo he sent to Butler with regard to Churchill’s 
attempts to obstruct Webster and Frankland in their efforts to produce what was 
always likely to be a difficult and controversial work:
97
 
 
I must express my astonishment that any individual should be allowed to make 
conditions concerning the text of the histories. I do not know what the attitude 
of the government would be to such an attempt, but I am quite sure that the 
reaction of Parliament and public opinion would be if the fact were known… 
it is quite wrong that any individual, however eminent, should have been 
given the power to cause indefinite delay and frustration in the conduct of 
public service.
98
 
 
In an article on Churchill as chronicler, Webster had praised the frankness with which 
Churchill had presented his history of the Second World War. Tellingly, he went on 
to say that ‘the same licence must be allowed others, and those engaged in writing the 
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war histories must be given the opportunity to use the secret documents with the same 
candour and regard for truth as Sir Winston himself has shown’.99 
 
As the first draft of Webster and Frankland’s work approached its conclusion, they 
were permitted to show it to a restricted audience to seek useful criticism. At this 
stage the manuscript was to remain secret until cleared for publication by the Cabinet 
Office.
100
 In April 1956 they received Sir Ian Jacob’s comments on the strategic role 
of Bomber Command between January 1943 and February 1944. Jacob said that he 
found Frankland fair to all the individuals concerned, but he took issue with the 
disclosure of the minute that Churchill had written condemning the bombing of 
Dresden, and then, under pressure from Portal, withdrawn.
101
 Significantly, this was 
the controversial minute that had asked whether the moment had come to question the 
bombing of Germany simply for the sake of terror. The official history described it as, 
perhaps amongst the least felicitous of the Prime Minister’s long series of wartime 
minutes.
102
 As Frankland observed, a minute withdrawn may, and in this case, did, 
say more about a process of thought than a revised one.
103
 
 
Sir Ian Jacob was a member of Butler’s panel of advisors and according to Frankland 
was vastly experienced, shrewd, intelligent, helpful, and reasonable. Personally he 
stood outside of the issues relating to the bomber offensive, with one exception; he 
had been charged by Churchill to look after his interests in matters of this sort. In 
Frankland’s words, Churchill, the great war-leader, still very much alive, wished 
history in its every detail to come out his way.
104
 Aware of Churchill’s capacity for 
interference and obstruction in defending his own interests – as well as the conditions 
he imposed on the use of his papers – the official historians had foregone using 
Churchill’s own papers in preparing their text. Webster’s prudence was rewarded 
when, as he predicted, they were able to discover all they wanted to know about 
Churchill and the bombing offensive from the Cabinet, Air Ministry, and Bomber 
Command files.
105
 Thus, when Jacob raised the issue of the controversial minute, 
Webster and Frankland regarded it as a mere straw in the wind, and rightly presumed 
that Jacob was well aware of the arguments the historians might advance. 
Nevertheless, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany had been subjected to 
attempts by Churchill to ensure his legacy, but Churchill had no authority to prevent 
full access to the other disparate files used by the official historians. 
 
In the preamble to Michael Howard’s review of The Strategic Air Offensive Against 
Germany he remarks that the term ‘Official History’ is self-contradictory; it rests on 
the assumption that the government cares to reveal the full extent of the muddle, 
inefficiency and waste inseparable from war’s conduct, and that perhaps no 
government should.
106
 He continues: ‘Official History should be marmoreal 
monuments to the heroism of the men who died in the campaigns they chronicle, 
blasting no reputations and offending no survivors.’ It is an assessment with which 
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Churchill might well have concurred. However, it was not a purpose with which Sir 
Charles Webster and Dr. Noble Frankland could agree. Howard describes Webster as 
one of the most honest and pugnacious scholars who has ever written history, and one 
formidably impatient of cant. As a work of individual, or more accurately, dual, 
scholarship, Howard considered SAOG to be an achievement possibly without parallel 
in military history.
107
 Unlike Churchill’s cursory treatment, the judgments that the 
authors reached are not easily to be questioned after the painstaking sifting of 
thousands of documents, unless by those who are prepared to make themselves 
equally expert; and of those, there can be few. And so it is remarkable that the 
publication of SAOG should have prompted so much controversy. 
 
Amongst the controversies that featured in SAOG there was the doctrinal debate 
between Harris and other senior commanders, both British and American, about 
issues such as the tactical bombing support of land forces during the preparation for 
Overlord, and attacks on oil and communications targets in the autumn on 1944.
108
 
Not surprisingly, Portal and Harris were not anxious to have their dirty linen aired in 
public, and Frankland subsequently referred to what he called an ‘unholy alliance’ 
between them to prevent publication of any reference to their debate about bombing 
policy towards the end of 1944.
109
 And yet, if the likelihood of ensuing controversy 
was a cause for concern for Churchill and the principal military commanders, they 
might well have been reassured by the assurance given by Brook to Prime Minister 
Macmillan that ‘official histories do not normally attract much public interest’. 110 
This was not a view with which Sir Charles Webster concurred. Frankland recalls that 
before his death, Webster had felt that they would not be ignored, and that their work 
would attract a great deal of attention.
111
 Although official histories might 
occasionally attract reviews outside of scholarly journals, they were not usually the 
subject of newspaper articles in the so-called quality press, let alone in the popular 
press, or on television. SAOG proved to be a striking exception to this generality.
112
 
Following in the wake of the publication of SAOG and the related press coverage, 
renewed interest in the strategic bomber offensive was indicated by the expanding 
historiography, and the subsequent debate. No longer was Churchill in a position to 
influence the growing body of literature. The work of Webster and Frankland was of 
such an irrefutably high standard that it had the effect of defining subsequent debate 
and the historiography.  
 
In his careful selection of documents for public consumption lay Churchill’s de facto 
revisionism. Many of his wartime colleagues were irritated by the one-sided nature of 
his account, and as the 1950s progressed some of them started to speak out.
113
 
Because academic historians were still denied access to government documents, and 
with many documents still considered to be personal minutes and telegrams, Churchill 
was shielded from the prospect of dissenting voices. Furthermore, Portal was an 
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intensely private man who never wrote his memoirs, while Harris expressly declined 
from publishing anything without the approval of Churchill himself. The revision of 
history had commenced before the publication of the official history, when Churchill 
sought to set the record straight in a manner of his choosing. So it would fall to the 
authors of the official history to complete the first major counter-revision to the 
historiography of the strategic bomber offensive from the narrative presented in SWW. 
As Reynolds remarks, in 1943 Churchill was on the defensive strategically; by 1950 
he was trying to defend himself against the historiography.
114
 
 
Conclusion 
There are a number of possible motivations for Churchill’s actions in downplaying 
the harsh reality of area bombing once victory was in sight and Britain was no longer 
facing an existential threat. He may have been stricken with moral qualm about the 
events he ordered and authorised. As the end of the war approached, members of 
parliament, bishops of the Church of England, and many others – for moral reasons – 
had been increasing the pressure on Churchill to adopt more discriminating methods 
of deploying the bomber force at his disposal. However, indications of moral doubt 
are exceedingly rare from a man who wrote and said so much and about whom so 
much has been written and spoken. In contrast, his support for bombing of the 
harshest kind was evident long before the Second World War started and he became 
Prime Minister and Defence Secretary. The man who crossed the floor of the House 
of Commons, twice, had also long demonstrated a capacity for self-interested political 
manoeuvring.  
 
Political ambition and a concern for history appear to have been the two most 
powerful motivations for Churchill. His sustained obfuscation of the detail of the 
bomber offensive and his part in it are much more likely to have been motivated by 
realpolitik and self-interest than moral outrage. As the end of the war approached, the 
great wartime leader was plotting not only the future shape of Europe, but planning 
his own place in history as well as further political office. As the end of the war 
neared there was a rapidly growing concern amongst the Western Allies over what a 
post-war Europe might look like. Rehabilitating and rebuilding Germany – and 
protecting it from Soviet expansionism – was a key strategic aim. Raking over the 
bombing damage, literally and metaphorically, would delay the building of 
sustainable peace and harmony between former enemies. Furthermore, increased 
public awareness of the detail of the bombings would only fuel the anger and 
judgement of the voices already raised against him at home.  Also problematic was 
the post-war descent into what would become the Cold War. While Germans might 
have complained about the destructiveness of area bombing and Churchill’s critics 
passed a harsher moral judgement on his part in area bombing, Churchill would also 
have been keen to avoid giving the Soviets any indication of the limits of the 
effectiveness of Britain’s bombing capability: all of which could have emerged from a 
detailed post-war bombing survey. 
 
Aware that the first major account of the war – especially from his unique vantage 
point – would have a significant impact on the assessments and commentaries to 
follow, Churchill was able, at least to some degree, to fashion history in his own 
image: enlightening and concealing as he saw fit. He would subsequently not allow – 
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as far as he was able – the controversy over the bomber offensive to detract from his 
personal legacy, downplaying its significance in his magnum opus: The Second World 
War. In addition, through deliberate obstruction, obfuscation and procrastination, 
Churchill would ensure that detailed analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness, and 
therefore the related morality, of the strategic air offensive against Germany through a 
comprehensive bombing survey, would be delayed for many years. As a result, his 
personal recollections and de facto revisionism would unduly impact upon the 
historiography of Britain’s Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany until Webster 
and Frankland’s four-volume work of that name was published in 1961: a work that 
he would most likely have impeded further if it has been within his abilities to do so. 
 
Churchill had made countless monumental decisions in which thousands, tens of 
thousands of lives and more were saved or sacrificed in the pursuit of victory: he 
stood by them and took maximum credit where possible. Yet his readiness to obscure 
the detail of the German city bombings and leave others to bear a disproportionate 
burden of blame is morally cowardly. In the oft-overlooked shadows of every plaudit 
Churchill received, and continues to receive for his wartime leadership, stands the 
practical and moral assessment of his decisions and actions, especially with regard to 
the bombing of the German cities. His choices were always understandable, usually 
necessary, and most often balanced on the side of justice. Throughout it all and 
subsequently, however, responsibility was always his more than anyone else’s to bear. 
His desire to write history in his favour should not be treated with humour and 
indulgence given his propensity not merely to avoid unwelcome blame or 
responsibility where he saw fit, but to relocate it elsewhere. None of the above 
necessarily detracts from Churchill’s popular standing as the greatest Briton of the 
twentieth century. However, it is presented as another reminder – if one were needed 
– that this great Briton was not a saint who should not be subjected to critical scrutiny, 
but an occasionally brilliant, flawed, temperamental, and deeply self-regarding 
individual whose achievements should not be viewed on his own terms through his 
rose-tinted historical revisionism. Churchill’s place in history is assured, but it is not 
for him to decide where that should be. 
 
 
